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The nature of the problem 
Ecological degradation and economic injustice are often the result of the extraction or 
transfer of natural resources from poorer to richer, more influential regions. Dams, 
highway constructions and other major public works projects frequently generate 
conflict over natural resources that can be linked to a lack of accountability and 
adequate compensation mechanisms to address the impacts of natural resource 
extraction and exploitation. The story told in this chapter is one of imbalances of power 
between local communities and local, regional and national institutions; and of the 
conflicts and accountability problems related to these imbalances. The tensions that 
arise between these actors centre on the right to water; who exercises it and how; and 
the barriers to realising that right. A key issue that emerges in this case is the difficulty 
in realising the right to water and establishing accountability over how watersheds are 
managed, given the complex sets of actors and overlapping institutions and histories 
involved.1  
 
Research for this chapter was carried out in the watershed of the Huazuntlán river (a 
tributary of the Coatzacoalcos) in southern Veracruz on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, 
                                                 
1 For example, within the area of the biosphere reserve (see Note 3) and the wider watershed, there are a 
variety of landholding patterns. Land tenure is both ejido and communal. Over 1,500 campesinos 
(peasants) in six villages, mainly Nahuas and Popolucas, inhabit the area. Some are the descendants of the 
indigenous population that has occupied the area since prehispanic times.  
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an area that provides 75 per cent of the water for industrial and human use in two petro-
industrial urban areas with over half a million inhabitants, Coatzacoalcos and 
Minatitlán. To supply water needed to fuel the oil industry along the coast of south-
eastern Mexico, water from the watershed is captured at the Yurivia dam (in the town of 
Tatahuicapan) in the rural mountainous rain forest region and transported for 60 
kilometres by aqueduct to the cities below.2 The compensation that these cities pay (or 
do not pay) to the indigenous communities living in the watershed is at the heart of a 
long history of conflict that has developed between these communities and the urban 
public water authorities.  
 
Not only does this extraction account for water scarcity, both for urban dwellers and for 
rural people, but it also contributes to the unsustainable management of the watershed 
territory. After heavy rains, urban households often lack water for three days because of 
the excess of sediment that clogs the dam and water treatment facilities. This problem is 
related, on one hand, to a model of development that promoted forms of land use 
unsuitable to tropical soils, such as the colonisation of the tropics and extensive cattle 
ranching (Tudela 1989; Ewell and Poleman, 1980; Lazos and Paré 2000). On the other 
hand, it is related to inadequate planning and fragmented (sectorialised) public policies, 
and a centralised system of decision making.3 Decentralisation reforms in Mexico are 
intended to create spaces for public participation and accountability mechanisms, but 
these are often only consultative and not representative, and lack a permanent 
institutional life (Ribot 2002; Blauert 2004). 4  
                                                 
2 The region is part of a biosphere reserve created in 1998. 
3 ‘An informal relationship between persons of unequal strata and power that presumes reciprocal but 
asymmetrical relations on both sides’ (Paré 1975: 58).  
4 ‘Most of the actual decentralisation reforms are characterised by an insufficient transfer of powers 
towards local institutions, under strict control of central government. Often local institutions do not 
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Against this background, this chapter will examine the different strategies used by 
indigenous communities to realise the right to water and, in seeking compensation for 
water transfer, to build accountability in the way that the watershed is used and 
managed. It considers the governance issues, changes in perceptions of water and rights, 
mechanisms for participation and accountability (or their absence), and the conditions 
that prevent or lead to successful mobilisation for accountability. What this chapter 
reveals is that building accountability and coresponsibility between numerous actors 
with diverse and contradictory interests requires an ongoing process of negotiation and 
engagement through both formal and informal channels. For the rural indigenous groups 
living in the watershed, establishing accountability and protecting their right to water 
involves new challenges in establishing horizontal relationships of coresponsibility. 
These have to emerge within the communities themselves around the responsibility for 
maintaining the watershed, as well as between the indigenous communities, the urban 
municipalities and the reserve management. Our argument about accountability is 
therefore that the governance of (scarce) water requires a variety of mechanisms that 
can help to reconcile competing notions of accountability and correlate the associated 
rights and duties (see Mehta, this volume). This chapter will show how traditional 
indigenous values can provide the basis for constructing a new, more solidly grounded 
culture of accountability.  
 
The chapter includes a methodological and conceptual framework; a mapping of the 
social actors involved in water governance, and of their interests and perceptions; a 
description of the institutional and legal framework for water management and the gaps 
                                                                                                                                               
represent the communities nor are they accountable towards them’ (Ribot 2002: ??, translated by Luisa 
Paré). page number?).  
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in mechanisms of accountability; and a discussion of the claims made by community 
organisations, and the resulting contestations, in the struggle to establish accountability. 
The chapter ends with some reflections on our role as researchers working to promote 
participatory and accountable natural resource management practices, and some 
conclusions about when particular strategies for demanding accountability around the 
right to water are successful. As an example of this, we present the strategy we designed 
in partnership with community groups for compensation of the environmental services 
they are providing.  
Multiple strategies for natural resources management: a conceptual framework  
In Mexico, the neoliberal development model’s privileging of market forces has 
accelerated environmental destruction and the erosion of traditional local institutions. 
Major development projects have often deepened regional inequalities and the urban–
rural gap as well as increasing social and political exclusion and poverty. The absence 
of an accountability framework to address these inequalities is due to a lack of 
developed accountability mechanisms and rules, the poor enforcement of those that do 
exist, and the persistence of a political culture based on client–patron relationships (Paré 
1975).  
 
When communities lose control over their land, environmental degradation and poverty 
increases. In this case study, the transformation of land use, from slash-and-burn 
indigenous maize production into cattle ranching, has brought about not only the 
disruption of the rainforest landscape but also major social, cultural and political 
transformations.5 Some authors define ‘resilience’ as the capacity of ecosystems to 
                                                 
5 In Tatahuicapan, over a period of 30 years, the extent of grassland converted from rainforest increased 
by 300 per cent (Lazos 1996 and Robles 2004). 
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absorb disturbances or recuperate from natural events such as floods (Berkes 2002). But 
the capacity of ecosystems to regenerate is also influenced by the relationship between 
environmental and social change, and by social actors and institutions. In this case 
study, the relationship between environmental degradation and community institutions 
has an important influence on accountability issues.  
 
Traditional notions of accountability are mostly limited to the obligation of 
governments to explain and justify their actions to citizens (Day and Klein 1987; 
Schacter 2000) and to electoral issues of ensuring ‘free and fair elections’. A narrow 
notion of accountability, as discussed in the introduction to this volume, is often 
reduced within a good governance agenda to ‘transparency’,6 focusing on the right to 
information. But a broader concept of societal accountability, as we saw in Chapter 2, 
‘involves social mechanisms outside the electoral sphere in which social movements 
supervise the legality of procedures carried out by politicians and public officials’ 
(Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2002: 32–3). 7 Also helpful to our discussion is the concept of 
cogovernance for accountability, which ‘confuses the boundary between state and 
society: in addition to coproducing specific services and pressuring government from 
the outside, social actors can also participate directly in the core functions of 
government itself’ (Ackerman 2004: 451).  
 
In terms of our case study, accountability is not reduced to a vertical claim by people 
against the state, but involves a two-way relationship in which different actors mutually 
                                                 
6 Transparency, now a popular idea with many social movements, is limited in the Mexican legislation to 
the obligation for governmental agencies to publish basic financial information on their web pages and 
the right of citizens to demand and obtain this information. 
7 “By focusing on the workings of traditional mechanisms of accountability, such as elections or the 
division of powers and the existence of an effective system of checks and balance among them, these 
diagnoses tend to ignore the growth of alternative forms of political control that rely on citizens’ actions 
and organizations¨ (p. 1). (op.cit.) Day and Klein?.  
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claim their rights, and also define their obligations. Achieving accountability is not a 
question of merely creating institutional arrangements from above, but a process that 
requires new forms of negotiation and institutional arrangements for natural resource 
management that can benefit both those living within the protected areas and those 
outside them (Gaventa 2004).  
 
Currently, and in relation to water specifically, there is a paradigm shift in the way that 
natural resources are seen. Water has moved from a common good but a tradable 
commodity (see Mehta, this volume), a shift that often distracts from community 
responsibilities for natural resource management. For example, in Mexico, payment for 
environmental services is seen, by the social movements organised around the 
opposition to mega projects and hydroelectric dams, as another attempt to privatise 
natural resources. In the final section of this chapter we describe our own experiences in 
relation to payment for environmental services, and examine the conditions under which 
it can provide better institutional arrangements that improve environmental conditions 
and livelihoods.  
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Starting with the premise that people are not only a threat to ecosystems but can be a 
force for conservation (Schelhas et al. 2001), it has been our intention to carry out a 
joint enquiry with communities into arrangements over water use and how indigenous 
people have confronted the situation they face.8 Our concern is not only to increase 
academic understanding but to generate reflections that contribute to effective collective 
action, and to identify alternative solutions, consistent with strategies of civil 
accountability described in chapter 2.  
 
As action researchers and active promoters of proposals for how accountability could be 
improved, we saw our role as part of a creative process of collective learning (Leeuwis 
2000) (see Box 4.1, p. 00). Towards this end, we organised a range of activities 
including fora, workshops, focus groups with local actors, training programmes and 
community resource mapping. Sharing history, culture, environmental policies and 
landscape assessment with the local population opened the doors to an intercultural 
dialogue, which helped to create a common vision of the problems. Working on ‘both 
sides of the equation’ (that is, through dialogue with both government institutions and 
communities) aims to increase ‘the receptivity of voice or responsiveness by the state’ 
(Gaventa 2004: 17), although there was often resistance on the part of government 
institutions. In the conclusion to this chapter, we refer to the lessons learnt: the 
successes, difficulties and failures of this approach in building a new culture of 
accountability that connects rural and urban relationships to water management.  
 
Mapping the different actors involved: conflicting uses, interests and perceptions 
                                                 
8 In action research or participatory research, community groups are not research objects but subjects that 
participates in the definition of the objectives of the whole process.  
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Figure 4.1 gives a picture of how the fluidity of water connects a variety of social 
actors. On its way down from the mountains in the reserve, the Texizapa river provides 
water for more than 13,000 people at local level. The Tecomaxochapan sacred spring 
has been transformed into a reservoir for the village of Tatahuicapan. Since 1985 the 
Yurivia dam has been diverting 800 litres per second from the Texizapa river to the 
industrial cities on the coast.  
 
The current conditions of the watershed are not favourable to its conservation on a long-
term basis. Pesticides, slash-and-burn agriculture on hills inclined at more than 35 per 
cent and cattle ranching produce erosion, pollution and sedimentation. The shrinking 
water volume seems to be of major concern to all the actors involved, including the 
people who live in the cities (especially the poor communities, who pay a 
disproportionately high cost for water), residents of the downstream villages, cattle 
ranchers using land on the reserve, and the urban municipalities authorities that control 
water distribution.  
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In Tatahuicapan, water is free and is seen as a common good. However the ecological 
conditions for resource management are now subject to individual or family-based 
decisions because the supportive societal norms either do not exist anymore or are not 
respected. The resilience of the system under these conditions is at risk. The fluidity of 
water streaming down the watershed is mirrored in the different interests and 
perceptions of different users regarding the nature of water and how it should be used. 
Indigenous groups now claim the right to reciprocity for water extraction, and thereby to 
development, whereas the urban poor see water as a basic right. Indigenous 
communities base their claims to water on cultural and mythical tradition, as well as on 
specific livelihood needs. In the cities, people have no idea of the ecological problems 
upstream, the causes of water scarcity, or the threats regarding future supply. They 
perceive water service as expensive and inefficient; in moments of shortage, their 
interests and rights appear to be in conflict with those of the rural providers.  
 
The table below helps to show the multiple actors and competing interests involved, 
including ourselves, as researchers. 
Table 4.1 Multiple actors and competing claims  
 
Key 
accountability 
conflicts 
Actors involved 
 
Competing claims 
to water/watershed 
Access to water Ejidos/Ranchers 
 
Urban municipalities 
 
Rural municipalities 
 
Agriculture 
 
Extraction for drinking water 
 
Drinking water/sacred resource 
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Petrochemical industries Extraction for industrial use 
Distribution of 
water 
Rural municipalities 
 
Urban municipalities 
 
Reserve management 
Dam on municipal territory, 
watershed includes ejidos 
Water shortages affect urban 
residents 
Conserving rainforest 
Watershed 
maintenance and 
conservation 
Rural municipalities 
 
Urban municipalities 
 
 
 
Reserve management 
 
 
Universities/NGOs 
(including ourselves) 
 
Federal and state government 
Sustainable livelihoods 
 
Periodic compensation to rural 
municipalities for watershed 
maintenance 
 
Rainforest conservation and 
livelihood protection 
 
Environmental conservation, 
poverty reduction 
 
Environmental conservation, 
economic development 
 
Conflicting interests and perceptions over water  
In order to understand the range of conflicting interests between so many different 
actors around the management of the watershed, how claims have developed and what 
strategies were used in different moments to build accountability, we sketch out a brief 
history of the institutional changes at local level, their effects on land use, the 
transformation of the rainforest, and perceptions of water. Across the region there is a 
strong sense of identity tied to the land. This is partly because at the end of the 
nineteenth century, before the Mexican Revolution, indigenous people lost part of their 
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land to large landowners. Through agrarian reform, land was partially recuperated, but 
is now under the legal status defined by the state (ejido land tenure). 
 
Prior to 1960, ejido land was owned in a communal way and traditional authorities – 
elder council, village chief (jefe de pueblo) – coexisted with ejido authorities recognised 
by the Agrarian Affairs Department (Velázquez 1997). The main crops were maize and 
beans. Water was perceived by the indigenous peasants of Tatahuicapan as a common 
good and local rules for its protection were strictly enforced through sanctions such as 
publicly exhibiting the offender or charging fines.9 For example, logging was banned on 
common land, and river banks remained forested. Sporadically, Tatahuicapan cattle 
ranchers ran for the municipal presidency, and began to gain more influence.  
 
Over the next twenty years, significant colonisation occurred as land was taken over, 
fenced in and virtually privatised into individual plots as government programmes gave 
priority to cattle ranching.10 But small indigenous cattle ranchers fought to redistribute 
the land that had been monopolised, won a significant court case, and began to gain 
political force. Water was still perceived as a common good, with shared rules for 
access, independent of the individualisation of land holding. In losing power at local 
level, big ranchers also lost their positions in the municipal governments, and this 
contributed to their loss of control over land they had gained in the previous decades.  
 
When the Yurivia dam was built in 1985, a large popular movement put pressure on the 
state government to respond to claims for education, health and public construction 
works for this marginalised area. After the dam was seized by villagers from the whole 
                                                 
9 Interviews with elder Nahua peasants. 
10 In 1960, five cattle ranchers controlled 57 per cent of the existing stock (Lazos 1996). 
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watershed area in 1985, the city government of Coatzacoalcos signed an agreement 
where, in return for water, it would provide the necessary investment to improve urban 
infrastructure and services in Tatahuicapan.11 When the city later reneged on the 
agreement, further mobilisation by the residents of Tatahuicapan led to negotiations for 
additional concessions. Shutting down the valves of the dam was the best way that they 
could find to make their voices heard, and the success of this strategy has meant that 
water has become a weighty factor in the mechanics of social and political pressure.  
 
Water has also gained an economic and a socio-political value for Tatahuicapan. 
Because the dam is on land owned by Tatahuicapan, the town itself has gained political 
clout and economic importance. Now in Tatahuicapan water transfer from the watershed 
to the cities is seen not only negatively but as an important instrument of negotiation. 
But despite concessions on services such as clinics and paving roads, no agreement was 
reached between the urban and rural municipal governments about watershed 
management. This brief description illustrates how perceptions of water have evolved 
following changes in landholding systems and patterns of water use.  
 
Water management: gaps in mechanisms of participation and accountability  
The fluid nature of water disperses its management between as many different 
institutions as the territories it crosses, resulting in atomisation of public interventions 
(land, water, forestry, agriculture, fisheries) and problematising greater inclusion and 
horizontal linkages between rural communities. The question of who is accountable to 
                                                 
11 A pre-Hispanic myth was revived during the excavations for the dam, when the machinery hit a huge 
serpent, a Nahuat symbol for water. In keeping with the legend, the machine’s operator died of fright. The 
serpent was taken to the capital zoo. As told to us by an older member of the community: ‘It was the 
male; the female serpent remained to protect the spring.’ The operator’s symbolic death re-established a 
kind of reciprocity that allowed the water to be removed (after demands were met). See Blanco et al. 
1992. 
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whom and on which issues becomes very complex as it involves multiple layers and 
chains of actors and institutions. In the next section, a short description of actors’ 
interests and dynamics will help to contextualise our work as action researchers and the 
proposal to local government discussed later.  
 
The dynamics of local institutions 12 
Specific conditions in the villages present a challenge to the adequate management of 
resources. It is through community institutions that the federal and state government 
applies its social, environmental and productive policies and programmes. For some 
indigenous people, water is sacred because they believe that revered spirits inhabit 
rivers and streams, this religious perspective is in paradoxical conflict with the poor 
management reflected by common practices such as pollution, deforestation and 
unsustainable fishery practices.13  
 
At the local level, the most important spaces for public participation are the assemblies 
(by ejido, village and barrio) and the working commissions. Changes in these 
institutions wrought by external programmes and actors have reduced the communal 
capacity to avoid negative impacts on their environment by creating or validating 
norms. Loss of community control is closely linked to changes in landholding systems, 
which have moved from communal to private tenure in 40 years. For instance, the 
government programme to regulate land tenure (PROCEDE) has contributed to the 
loosening of the assembly’s powers to regulate land use, including sales and purchases. 
This practice has now expanded to include outsiders, who are not interested in local 
institutions such as the village assembly. Since the municipality was created, land-based 
                                                 
12 Here we adopt Leach et al.’s (1997) concept of institutions, ‘as regularised patterns of behaviour that 
emerge from underlying structures or sets of rules in use’. 
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governance institutions (ejido assembly, comisariado ejidal and vigilance council) have 
become isolated and have fewer connections with other local and regional institutions. 
Different political parties fight to control either the municipal government or agrarian 
authorities such as the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs. The current municipal government, 
in office for a three-year term, has become a protagonist in the politics around 
watershed management. But while the current municipal government is open to 
cooperation, the continuity of plans and possibilities for collaboration with non-
governmental actors are subject to power shifts within and between political parties.  
 
Although traditional indigenous community structures are being eroded, they still 
maintain principles of reciprocity and cooperation (Mauss 1950, Durston 2002), as well 
as the necessary trust for the tasks required (Durstom 2000). These practices should not 
be romanticised, but they are important in understanding how accountability can 
function at the local level. For example, the tequio is a traditional institution used for 
public works based on mano vuelta (exchange of non-paid labour among peasants). 
While increasingly less common, these traditions do persist. Although the term 
‘accountability’ does not exist in local indigenous culture, the values of reciprocity and 
cooperation, and the constant consultation between local authorities and the assembly 
on overarching issues, constitute a form of accountability in practice. Municipal 
government must respect decisions taken at the general public assembly. It is also on the 
basis of these values that villagers demand information from local authorities regarding 
their actions. However, there have been cases when accountability at the local level has 
broken down. For example, when the local water committee did not provide information 
on how fees villagers paid for the network maintenance were being used, people 
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stopped paying and refused to participate in the committee’s assemblies.14 Local 
institutions are in constant interaction with external actors, including both the federal 
and state government, concerning social policies, financing and other issues. These 
interactions are regulated by a legal framework. The way that the legal framework is 
enforced, however, often does not contribute to the consolidation of long-term 
institutional arrangements based on consensus between the different actors involved. 
The next section examines this problem.  
 
Governmental institutions  
In Mexico, the legal framework for water is governed by the Law of National Waters 
and supported by other statutes such as the environmental law [which? Spell out] and 
norms related to water quality. According to the national constitution, water resources 
belong to the Mexican state. The National Water Commission is a semi-autonomous 
federal authority, which is part of the Ministry of Environment. The official position of 
the federal government is that community participation should play a key role in the 
sustainable management of water. The National Hydraulic Programme for 2001–6 
includes institutionalised social participation in water management through river basin 
councils, commissions and committees amongst its objectives. Among diverse strategies 
to achieve the sustainable management of water in Mexico is that of ‘inducing societal 
recognition of water’s economic value, and to consolidate organized society’s 
participation in water management’ (NHP 2001–6).  
 
At the national level, 26 river basin commissions have been created to represent diverse 
users. However, providers from the catchment sites are not represented on these 
                                                 
14 Interview with the head of theTatahuicapan water supply.  
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commissions. The authorities of the mountain villages such as Tatahuicapan are often 
unaware of the existence of their right to participate in this commission. They have not 
been included, although it is precisely the space where the integration between 
environmental, forestry and water policies could be addressed. There are some 
questions as to the scope for participation in the river basin commissions: this 
participation is relative and limited as the law confers on the National Water 
Commission the authority to decide whom to invite. This feature allows the 
Commission’s officers to manipulate the balance of power and to direct decisions 
towards objectives already established at other levels (Castelán 2000: 183–4). 
 
Sub-watershed and micro-watershed committees could be an important planning 
instrument but, throughout the country, very few have been created or function when 
they do exist. At the time of writing, we were still awaiting a response from a state 
government agency we invited to help with the formation of such a committee for the 
watershed in Veracruz. Each ministry defines its strategy without real coordination with 
other actors (even if legal instruments and formal agreements require holistic 
approaches). The result is that policies are not only uncoordinated but often 
contradictory. Water management institutions such as the Municipal Water and 
Sanitation Commission and even the National Water Commission seem to believe that 
their job starts from the tap down, as opposed to starting with watersheds where water is 
produced. Until very recently, these institutions did not coordinate their policies with 
the agencies in charge of the environment in the watershed, such as the Management of 
the Reserve, Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente (PROFEPA), and the 
Secretaría de Reecursos Naturales y Medio Ambiente (SEMARNAT). This fragmented 
vision erodes the capacity of government agencies (for both water provision and water 
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use) to protect the ecosystems. According to the Coatzacoalcos Municipal Commission 
for Water and Sanitation, water supply is not guaranteed for more than eight years, yet 
there is no coordinated water policy for the whole mountain area. Neither have the 
municipalities and ejidos within the watershed issued norms or regulations for the 
protection of water resources.  
 
The accountability issue in all of this relates to the difficulty of enforcing existing laws 
and procedures for a better-planned system, including coordinated institutional 
interventions that would benefit both the cities and rural municipalities through the 
creation of arrangements to mitigate future conflicts between rural and urban 
communities. Building accountability is difficult because local institutions lack 
information about their entitlements within this legal framework, and higher authorities 
lack political will to listen to the voice of indigenous people, even when they have 
sound proposals. Within this context, there is no simple recipe for creating 
accountability, nor will accountability be achieved merely by designing improved 
institutional structures. Instead, power inequities need to be confronted and new cultures 
of accountability nurtured. 
 
Power struggles between these institutions are in evidence. The remit of the National 
Water Commission involves significant powerful interests and money. Conservation 
institutions such as SEMARNAT have smaller budgets than the ministries of Energy, 
Finance or Economy.15 In a context of weak accountability and a lack of participation, it 
                                                 
15 In 2005, SEMARNAT had a US$1,542 million dollars budget; Hacienda US$2,162; SAGARPA 
US$3,376; and ENERGIA US$2,396. 
http://www.shcp.sse.gob.mx/contenidos/presupuesto_egresos/temas/ppef/2005/index.html 
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is not easy to target policies on local agreements for water conservation, or develop 
oversight and monitoring mechanisms that could lead to greater accountability. Given 
this landscape of institutional actors, the next section will explore the strategies used at 
the local level to build more accountable management of the watershed.  
 
Conflicts, claims and strategies  
Since the dam was built in 1985, Tatahuicapan has struggled to obtain the enforcement 
of state commitments concerning education, communication and health services. When 
the state did not deliver on these commitments, groups from Tatahuicapan cut the water 
supply to the cities by closing off the dam valves, which has led to further conflict. The 
main demand behind these cuts was and still is constructed around reciprocity as the 
basis of a fair exchange (water for services). However, what has developed is a cycle 
where conflict breaks out between the residents of Tatahuicapan and the cities’ water 
authorities. Village residents cut the water supply or take other similar measures, and 
the cities respond by appeasing the residents with short-term benefits that do not address 
the underlying problem of sustainable watershed management. Through this logic of 
conflict–negotiation–conflict, marginalised indigenous groups have obtained some 
short-term benefits, alleviating some social pressure for broader or more substantive 
changes.  
 
However it does not always work out well for the political mediators. In 1985, when the 
community stopped the dam construction, community mobilisations overwhelmed the 
leaders. When people found out what type of negotiations their local authorities had 
agreed to regarding the construction of a health centre, they kidnapped the leaders and 
interrupted the construction until state authorities came to negotiate again. Traditional 
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community practices of accountability required the leaders of the movement to exert 
pressure for compliance with the agreements.  
 
The lack of accountability of the existing municipal authorities of Mecayapan (to which 
Tatahuicapan belonged at that time) in negotiations with the cities over their 
commitments to provide services to the villages resulted in the inhabitants of the 
watershed developing a strategy for direct action. In October 1993 some four thousand 
indigenous people, armed with bows, arrows and machetes, closed the valves of the dam 
and left the cities without water for three days. Four years later the new municipality of 
Tatahuicapan was recognised by the state Congress, which meant that the government 
had a responsibility to provide services to the municipality. Each case of direct action 
by indigenous groups against the dam is answered by the urban municipal governments 
with immediate material concessions, such as paving a road or contributing money 
towards a school. These responses do not address the underlying causes of conflict. The 
delay in the delivery of these concessions fuels the cycle of social mobilisation, which 
sometimes leads to violence. Water has become a tool to exert pressure on the 
government, and some groups in Tatahuicapan have clearly come to believe that cutting 
off the water supply is the only way to draw government attention to their needs. 
  
It is difficult to discern if the city government’s delay in introducing institutionalised 
accountability, such as formal procedures for compensations, is deliberate. The fact that 
urban authorities have managed to deal with such uncertain institutional arrangements 
for over 20 years shows that city governments were not under much pressure from their 
citizens to provide information about what really goes on in the water catchment areas 
and how the city water authority invests the funds from the fees paid for water. In the 
Chapter 4 
Rights, Resources and the Politics of Accountability 
 
 20
absence of predictable rules and durable institutions, the residents of Tatahuicapan (the 
weaker party) occasionally have been able to hold the city hostage in order to speed up 
the process of legal recognition of their territory as a separate municipality. The cost of 
this unpredictability for urban consumers is that they have had to put up with water 
shortages because city authorities do not honour agreements made with the rural 
mountain communities, and because the sustainable management of the catchment area 
seems not to be in the political interests of any of the institutional actors involved. The 
dynamics of conflict over water, and the strategies used by indigenous groups in 
Tatahuicapan to force government actors to deliver on their commitments, illustrate how 
accountability is a two-way relationship. Thus having adequate institutions in place does 
not necessarily lead to accountability without citizen action. 
 
Building accountability through shared responsibility: a plan built through action-
research 
Over the past three years of participatory research, we engaged in dialogue with the 
local government in Tatahuicapan to generate new concepts and practices for more 
accountable institutional arrangements over the long term. In our experience, Leeuwis’s 
argument that solutions to the dilemma of contradictory interests are possible when the 
actors involved can create spaces for negotiating strategies, and find tools to strengthen 
trust, faces some significant challenges (Leeuwis 2002). Changes in some of the 
institutional relations analysed above, which are embedded in a context of conflict, 
clientelism, exclusion, lack of coordination, and the absence of spaces for participation, 
require new forms of negotiation and institutional arrangements. For instance, in 
practice, the government only pays compensations in some years and not in others.  And 
as no conservation plans exist, the compensation funds are not invested in reforestation 
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or sustainable land management projects, but in urban services in Tatahuicapan. The 
army manages government reforestation programmes without significant participation 
by local people. Only the district head municipality is allowed to participate in 
negotiations over the reforestation programme. The remainder of the villages in the 
watershed are excluded from this process.  
 
The adoption of new political practices that can contribute to greater accountability is 
possible only if there is political will on both sides. Participatory governance is an 
alternative that can lead to increased accountability to marginalised groups, but it can 
not be ‘simply achieved from above with new policy statements, but … requires 
multiple strategies of institutional change, capacity building, and behavioural change’ 
(Gaventa 2004: 5). This section will explore the advances that have been made in 
building accountability and realising the right to water, in part through our own efforts 
as action researchers.  
 
Over the past three years, we have developed an agenda around building mechanisms 
that would lead to greater accountability and sustainable management of the watershed, 
involving both rural and urban poor. We have started planning meetings in the villages 
to organise a regional committee to facilitate a redistribution of decision-making power 
to local and regional levels. This committee will also help to build trust between users 
and providers, and between rural and urban poor and government institutions. With the 
institutionalisation and long-term perspective of local and regional agreements where 
local actors have representation, the risk of conflict is diminished. A fund will be 
administered by the watershed committee, on the basis of land management plans, 
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administering and monitoring the funds for the watershed restoration.16  This proposal 
creates the possibility of financing rural development by taking into account the 
externalities in the cost of water. Several mechanisms, including payment for 
environmental services, taken either from the users’ fees or from subsidies, would 
support development infrastructure and sustainable production.  
 
Our approach to increasing accountability is summarised in a manifesto now signed by 
both local government institutions and community groups: A Strategy for Common 
Survival: Water and the Relationship between Tatahuicapan, Coatzacoalcos, Minatitlán 
and Cosoleacaque. It synthesises many discussions with all of the key actors involved, 
and represents a shift from the traditional form of negotiation because it is contingent 
upon the willingness of representative stakeholders from both the cities and the villages 
to discuss new arrangements of rules.  
 
This shift towards increased dialogue between urban and rural political institutions does 
not exclude the possibility of social mobilisations. As Gaventa has argued, the 
possibility for social mobilisation is an important element in building accountability: 
 
Given that inequalities in power often exist, the struggle to attain authentic and 
meaningful voice by community leaders may involve conflict, as well as 
collaboration. While some approaches to partnership overemphasise consensus 
building to the exclusion of conflict, others point out that conflict and 
collaboration often must go hand in hand. (Gaventa 2004: 16) 
 
                                                 
16 This plan includes agroecological alternatives such as agroforestry, intensive cattle ranching, soil 
conservation and the establishment of community norms concerning access to natural resources. 
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But the contents of the new proposal address both spaces for citizen participation, and 
compensation mechanisms for watershed management. Traditionally, in exchange for 
water, rural indigenous communities demanded development in kind: schools, roads, 
health centres and basic services. Now cash is required to finance watershed restoration. 
The president of the Tatahuicapan municipality, in his only appearance at the 
commission before his term ended, announced at a river basin commission meeting that 
part of the resources obtained from the fees paid for water would be deposited in a 
municipal fund as a form of ‘social investment for sustainability’ to finance projects for 
the watershed restoration.17 This proposal has some advantages over the mainstream 
approach of payment for environmental services, as we explain below.  
 
The federal government has initiated a Payment for Hydrological Environmental 
Services Programme. However, in the Tuxtlas watershed, the failure of the government 
to deliver the payment promised during the first year in that part of the reserve provoked 
rejection by the local communities. The main problem with the programme (which 
entails a five-year period of obligatory conservation of forest cover) is that, rather than 
involving people in community participation for sustainable management, the 
programme offers individual contractual relationships between the government 
institution and the local authority that do not always deliver the correct amount of funds 
to the registered owner of the land. Significant internal conflicts have resulted from this 
ill-conceived approach.  
 
Our alternative proposal involves community agreements and mechanisms to establish 
permanent norms and responsibilities. The participation of all the main actors – 
                                                 
17 ‘Social investment for sustainability’ involves raising funds for conservation and restoration of the 
resources that underlie the compensation for environmental services.  
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including watershed villagers, local rural authorities, urban municipalities, state and 
regional water bodies, the reserve director and local NGOs – in the fund’s decisions 
would guarantee accountability. Despite the conciliatory nature of the president of 
Tatahuicapan’s speech at the Coatzacoalcos river basin commission meeting, the main 
official response was to deny the commission the ability to deal with these demands, 
which would become a responsibility of the urban municipalities.  
 
Accountability mechanisms 
The tools to share decision making and enforce accountability that have been developed 
by the municipal president of Tatahuicapan and our team include an effective legal 
framework, mechanisms of technical/environmental monitoring, and a social audit. 
While these are very specific institutional steps, they are being taken in conjunction 
with wider measures to build trust and dialogue between the different actors involved. 
The legal framework must reflect local and regional agreements; a technical monitoring 
will verify the responsible use of resources according to the management plan; and a 
social audit will ensure social equity among the rural stakeholders.  
 
Although this will be a long-term process, some results are already discernible. 
Improvements in village sanitation have been made, such as fencing in pigs that pollute 
local water supplies and spread disease. A geographical information system and 
management plan for the watershed communities now serves to raise funds and as a 
reference for monitoring results. Alliances with urban actors have raised awareness of 
the cause of problems and willingness to cooperate with this plan. 
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 The three-year term for local government is short and processes to create a new culture 
of accountability can easily be interrupted. In our view, our most important achievement 
to date has been the formation of experimental groups of men and women that have 
opened discussion at a community level about how to develop an environmental agenda. 
These groups are now engaged in finding representatives to take forward their 
proposals, and to influence public policies. They have formed an environmental citizen 
committee to discuss water management with the cities and different institutions. 
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Lessons learnt about researching accountability 
 
Throughout the case described in this chapter, we played different roles, sometimes 
simultaneously. Sometimes we were interviewers, or advisers in resource management and 
farming techniques, and at other times our role was to provide information and lobby 
government officials. But we always worked towards the objective of trying to reconstruct trust 
between the rural indigenous communities with water institutions in the cities. Based on this 
wide range of activities and our long history of engagement in processes at the local level in 
Veracruz, we highlight here some of the key lessons we learned about researching 
accountability.18  
 
• The importance of understanding historical and cultural context. When we 
walked together with men and women from Tatahuicapan to their sacred spring for 
the first time, we were able to learn about the different perceptions of men and 
women, young and old, about the causes of deforestation and the different 
approaches to solving it. This experience showed how our vision for accountable 
management of the watershed is just one among many.  
 
• Creating new parameters for negotiation. This requires ongoing discussion 
between different cultural perspectives and different values, and that all the actors 
involved should respect these differences. The values of reciprocity and 
cooperation, and a vision of the common good were important assets that 
communities brought to their struggles for greater accountability and the right to 
water. 
  
• Respecting the pace of political and social change. When involved in interviews 
with bureaucrats within the water management authorities in the cities, sometimes 
we felt we were getting ahead of the local government rhythm of change and it was 
necessary to slow down. There is a risk that research can undermine existing 
processes of representation, and take on roles that are not legitimate. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown how informal strategies for demanding accountability have a 
central role in securing the right to water. We can now offer some key conclusions 
about improving accountability within this context. 
 
Contradictions between local perceptions of rights 
 Conflicting legal frameworks and the web of economic and political power make it 
very difficult to institutionalise accountability mechanisms. The principles that underpin 
indigenous institutions, such as reciprocity and cooperation, can be reframed in terms of 
the management of the common good. They can also perpetuate conflict and lead to a 
crisis of governance. In the past, some situations have led to successful mobilisations 
while others have presented difficulties. Even when the city governments respond to 
accountability claims by the indigenous communities, their impact has been fleeting and 
has not helped to forge new mechanisms for long-term accountability. The responses of 
cities and the reserve management did not address underlying inequalities in ways that 
would help to avoid future problems in water supply. 
 
Long-term strategies for accountability 
The negotiation process must be seen as a middle-term and long-term strategy 
dependent on many internal and external factors. The three-year terms of the municipal 
government are not long enough to consolidate new institutional arrangements, which 
emerge in large part through a slow process of consensus building, both internally and 
with external institutions. 
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Changing both sides of the equation 
In order to increase the possibilities of a partnership or dialogue between actors with 
different degrees of power, changes are required on the government’s side to create 
deliberative spaces open to all actors and respectful of the different perceptions, views, 
needs and proposals of others. For the community, there are also great challenges. On 
one side the water issue has to be perceived in a generalised way as a problem that 
concerns not only the cities but also the villagers’ welfare and responsibilities. Much 
more has to be done to enable the villages to improve the management of their own 
water resources.  
 
Building alliances for accountability 
What is needed is increased awareness, both in the urban municipal governments and in 
the communities within the watershed, about what is necessary to improve the 
management of water resources. The strengthening of alliances between different levels 
and forms of government – even, within Tatahuicapan, between the municipal 
government and the ejido –  is an important first step for consensus to be built around a 
sustainable development plan. These processes offer hope that the cycles of conflict and 
environmental degradation that impede the realization of the right to water in both rural 
and urban contexts can be ended.  
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ACRONYMS 
 
CAN, Comisión Nacional del Agua, Nacional Water Comisión. 
CMAS, Comisión Municipal de Agua y Saneamiento, Municipal Commission for Water 
and Sanitation 
DECOTUX 
PROCEDE, Programa de Cesión de Derechos Ejidales. Program for Cession (¿) of 
Ejido rights 
RBC, River Basin Commission 
 
